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THE IMP ACT OF LIABILITY FOR ENHANCED INJURY 
Edward S. Digges, Jr. t 
The author discusses the recent imposition of a duty on 
automobile manufacturers to design a product that is "crash-
worthy. " He concludes that the courts will use a "balancing 
test" to determine the scope of that duty, and discusses the 
application of this test. Various attendant problems, such as the 
seat belt defense and the relevance of uniform federal safety 
standards, are also considered. 
A novel recovery approach known as "crashworthiness"l has 
developed in automobile product litigation. Its thesis is that manufac-
turers have a duty to design and construct automobiles that will not 
expose the occupants to an unreasonable risk of injury in the event of a 
collision.2 Proof that an alleged defect in the automobile caused or 
contributed to the initial collision is not conceptually necessary for 
recovery 3 if the defect, usually in design, was a substantial factor in 
causing or enhancing4 injuries. 
The typical case involves an allegation that injuries suffered in a 
collision would not have occurred if the automobile had been designed 
differently. The initial judicial controversy was whether involvement in 
tA.B., Princeton University, 1968; J.D., University of Maryland, 1971; Associate, Piper & 
Marbury, Baltimore, Maryland; Member Maryland Bar. 
1. Often referred to as the "second collision" or "secondary .impact" theory (see, e.g., 
Driesonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066, 1069 n.3 (1974», the term 
"crashworthiness," as defined in the Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act, 
"means the protection that a passenger motor vehicle affords its passengers against 
personal injury or death as a result of a motor vehicle accident." 15 U.S.C. § 1901(14) 
(1974). 
2. As one commentator summarizes: 
In a nutshell, the proponents contend that common law liability may be imposed 
upon the automobile industry, based upon an allegation that the car in question 
could have been made "safer" for collision with other cars or objects, irrespective 
of how the crash was caused. Hoenig & Goetz, A Rational Approach to 
"Crashworthy" Automobiles: The Need for Judicial Responsibility, 6 Sw. U.L. 
REV. I, 3 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Hoenig & Goetz]. 
3. Commencing with the landmark case of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 
111 N.E. 1050 (1916), automobile manufacturers have been subject to liability for 
damages for injuries resulting from a collision that was proximately caused by a defect in 
their product. 
4. One writer explains: 
These suits are not grounded upon the theory that a defect in the car caused the 
primary impact, but rather that the injuries sustained were exacerbated by a defect 
in design. The exacerbation usually occurs as a result of the occupant's collision 
with the interior of the vehicle,.. .. Sklaw, "Second Collision" Liability: The 
Need for Uniformity, 4 SETON HALL L. REV. 499,507 (1973). 
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a collision could be considered an "intended use" of an automobile.s In 
Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 6 the recognized "judicial genesis of the 
'crashworthiness'theory,"? the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit 
concluded that collisions are "a frequent and inevitable contingency of 
normal automobile use,"8 and there is no "sound reason, either in logic 
or experience, nor any command in precedent, why the manufacturer 
should not be held to a reasonable duty of care in the design of its 
vehicle consonant with the state of the art to minimize the effect of 
accidents.,,9 Thus, an automobile manufacturer "is under a duty to use 
reasonable care in the design of its vehicle to avoid subjecting the user 
to an unreasonable risk of injury in the event of a collision."lo 
Since Larsen, II there has been a nationwide trend to recognize this 
"crashworthiness" duty, of which the Maryland Court of Appeals 
recently became a part. 12 The scope of the manufacturer's duty is still 
5. Evans v. General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 836 
(1966), is the recognized starting point for review of judicial consideration of the issue. In 
Evans, the plaintiff's decedent was killed in a broadside collision while operating a station 
wagon manufactured by the defendant. There was no contention that any defect in the 
station wagon caused the collision or that the automobile was unfit for its normal highway 
use. Rather, the claim was based on the fact that the station wagon was designed with an 
"X" frame and the driver's seat was located near the intersection of the "X." Unlike the 
designs of some other automobile manufacturers, the defendant's design did not provide 
frame siderails. The plaintiff contended that, in the event of a broadside collision, this 
omission created an unreasonable risk of harm for the occupants of the station wagon and 
that the use of siderails would have prevented or reduced the occupants' injuries. The 
court held that while, under Indiana law, a manufacturer's duty is to make a product 
reasonably safe for its intended use, 
The intended purpose of an automobile does not include its participation in 
collisions with other objects, despite the manufacturer's ability to foresee the 
possibility that such collisions may occur. Id. at 825. 
For an earlier case, see Tamburello v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 206 F. Supp. 920 
(E.D. La. 1962), which involved a direct action against the ins.urer of the manufacturer of 
a baby car seat. The initial collision occurred when a 1960 station wagon went into a 
ditch, crossed a road and struck a tree. A baby girl seated in the car seat struck the 
dashboard and the floor. In granting summary judgment for the defendant, the court 
focused on the causation issue. The court held that the driver's loss of control of the car 
was the proximate cause of the injury. The failure of the car seat was held to be at most a 
remote cause. 206 F. Supp. at 923. 
6. 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968). In Larsen, the plaintiff suffered head injuries when the 
automobile he was driving was involved in a head-on collision with another automobile. 
The plaintiff sued the manufacturer of his vehicle contending that the design of the 
steering column caused him injuries he would not have received had a different design 
been employed. The plaintiff further contended that the rearward displacement of the 
steering shaft on the frontal impact was greater on his automobile than it would have been 
in other cars that "were designed to protect against such a rearward displacement." Id. at 
497. 
7. Hoenig & Goetz, supra note 2, at 12. 
8. 391 F.2d at 502. The federal district court had granted summary judgment for the 
manufacturer, holding that Michigan law imposed no duty on an automobile manufacturer 
to make a vehicle that would protect the plaintiff from injury in the event of a head-on 
collision. 274 F. Supp. 461 (D. Minn. 1967). 
9. 391 F.2d at 503. 
10. Id. at 502. 
11. Interestingly, on remand, the Larsen trial resulted in a jury verdict for the defendant. 
12. See Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Young, 272 Md. 201, 321 A.2d 737 (1974); Frericks 
v. General Motors Corp., 274 Md. 288, 336 A.2d 118 (1975). 
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in the evolving stages, however. All of the cases that have adopted the 
"crashworthiness" doctrine steadfastly adhere to the principles that 
there should be no duty to make the automobile crashproof and that 
the manufacturer should not be made an insurer of the user's safety. 13 
The questions thus arise: What are the parameters of the manufacturer's 
duty? Where is the line between "crashworthy" and "crashproof"? This 
article will examine these problems, as well as a few interesting 
by-products. 
The historical development of the "crash worthiness" doctrine is treated in more 
detail in The Young and Frericks cases: Re-examining Traditional Theories of 
Manufacturer Liability for Product Defects infra. It should be noted here, however, that 
utilizing principles of negligence, warranty, or strict liability in tort; the appellate 
systems of thirteen states have adopted this "crashworthiness" doctrine first accepted in 
Larsen. Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121,501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 
(1972); Evancho v. Thiel, 297 So.2d 40 (Fla. App. 1974); Friend v. General Motors 
Corp., 118 Ga. App. 763, 165 S.E.2d 734, cert. dismissed, 225 Ga. 290, 167 S.E.2d 926 
(1969); Brandenburger v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 162 Mont. 506, 513 P.2d 
268 (1973) (But see Ford Motor Co. v. Rupple, 161 Mont. 56, 504 P.2d 686 (1972), 
where a summary judgment for the manufacturer in a "crashworthiness" case was 
affirmed. Apparently, Brandenburger, the later case, is controlling, but the Branden· 
burger court did not expressly overrule the Rupple precedent. Instead, the court quoted 
extensively from the latter, noting only that the Rupple summary judgment had been 
granted "under the facts presented." 162 Mont. 506,511, 513 P.2d 268, 271); Bolm v. 
Triumph Corp., 33 N.Y.2d 151, 305 N.E.2d 769,350 N.Y.S.2d 644 (1973); Johnson v. 
American Motors Corp., 225 N.W.2d 57 (N.D. 1974); May v. Portland Jeep, Inc., 265 
Ore. 307, 509 P.2d 24 (1973); Mickle v. Blackmon, 252 S.C. 202, 166 S.E.2d 173 
(1969); Engberg v. Ford Motor Co., 205 N.W.2d 104 (S.D. 1973); Ellithrope v. Ford 
Motor Co., 503 S.W.2d 516 (Tenn. 1973); Turner v. General Motors Corp., 514 S.W.2d 
497 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974); Baumgardner v. American Motors Corp., 83 Wash. 2d 751, 
522 P.2d 829 (1974); Arbet v. Gussarson, 66 Wis. 2d 551, 225 N.W.2d 431 (1975). 
Additionally, federal courts, pursuant to diversity principles, have predicted that the 
appellate systems in seven other states would follow the "crashworthiness" precept when 
confronted with the issue. Nanda v. Ford Motor Co., 509 F.2d 213 (7th Cir. 1974) 
(applying lllinois law); Perez v. Ford Motor Co., 497 F.2d 82 (5th Cir. 1974) (applying 
Louisiana law); Turcotte v. Ford Motor Co., 494 F.2d 173 (1st Cir. 1974) (applying 
Rhode Island law); Driesonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066 (4th Cir. 
1974) (applying Virginia law); Passwaters v. General Motors Corp., 454 F.2d 1270 (8th 
Cir. 1972) (applying Iowa law); Huddell v. Levin, 395 F. Supp. 64 (D.N.J. 1975) 
(applying N2W Jersey law)(But see Yetter v. Rajeski, 364 F. Supp. 105 (D.N.J. 1973»; 
Hardy v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 65 F.R.D. 359 (W.O. Pa. 1975), and Dyson v. 
General Motors Corp., 298 F. Supp. 1064 (E.D. Pa. 1969) (both cases applying 
Pennsylvania law). 
Conversely, two state appellate systems have adopted the Evans viewpoint: 
Mississippi, in Walton v. Chrysler Corp., 229 So. 2d 568 (Miss. 1969) and Ohio, in Gleich 
v. General Motors Corp., 29 Ohio App. 2d 28, 277 N.E.2d 566 (1971). 
Federal courts have reasoned that the appellate systems of four states other than 
Indiana (Evans was decided on Indiana law) would not find the existence of a 
"crashworthiness" duty: Polk v. Ford Motor Co., 2 CCH PROD. LIAB. REP. ~ 7305 (8th 
Cir. 1974) (applying Missouri law); Yetter v. Rajeski, 364 F. Supp. 105 (D.N.J. 1973) 
(applying New Jersey law); Alexander v. Seaboard Air Line R.R., 346 F. Supp. 320 
(W.D.N.C. 1971), aff'd per curiam, [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH PROD. LIAB. REP. 
~ 6748 (4th Cir. 1972) (applying North Carolina law); McClung v. Ford Motor Co., 333 
F. Supp. 17 (S.D.W. Va. 1971), aff'd per curiam, 472 F.2d 240 (4th Cir. 1973) (applying 
West Virginia law). 
For a useful reference on the conflicting authorities on the crashworthiness issue, 
see Annot., 42 A.L.R.3d 560 (1972). 
13. See, e.g., Evancho v. Thiel, 297 So. 2d 40 (Fla. App. 1974); Brandenburger v. Toyota 
Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 162 Mont. 506, 513 P.2d 268 (1973); Bolm v. Triumph Corp., 
33 N.Y.2d 151,305 N.E.2d 769, 350 N.Y.S.2d 644 (1973). 
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THE SCOPE OF THE MANUFACTURER'S DUTY-
THE MARYLAND VIEWPOINT 
[Vol. 5 
Volkswagen of America, Inc. u. Young l4 was the first Maryland 
Court of Appeals case to raise the issue of "the extent of an automobile 
manufacturer's liability for a design defect resulting in enhanced 
injuries .... "IS The court held: 
In sum, "traditional rules of negligence" lead to the conclusion 
that an automobile manufacturer is liable for a defect in design 
which the manufacturer could have reasonably foreseen would 
cause or enhance injuries on impact, which is not patent or 
obvious to the user, and which in fact leads to or enhances the 
injuries in an automobile collision.16 
14. 272 Md. 201, 321 A.2d 737 (1974). The issue reached the Maryland Court of Appeals 
from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia by way of the 
Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act, MD. ANN. CODE, Cts. and Jud. Proc. Art., 
§ 12·601 et seq. 
15. 272 Md. at 206, 321 A.2d at 740. The Maryland Court of Special Appeals was actually 
the first Maryland appellate court to consider the issue. See Frericks v. General Motors 
Corp., 20 Md. App. 518, 317 A.2d 494 (1974), vacated in 274 Md. 288, 336 A.2d 118 
(1975). 
16. 272 Md. at 216, 321 A.2d at 745. The court also held: "The standard to be applied is the 
traditional one of reasonableness." Id. at 217, 321 A.2d at 746. Additionally, in both 
Young, at 272 Md. at 220-22, 321 A.2d at 74748 and Frericks, at 274 Md. at 298-99, 
336 A.2d at 124, the Maryland Court of Appeals declined to accept the doctrine of strict 
liability in tort espoused in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). However, 
the Young court noted: 
Regardless of whether the theory of § 402A of the Restatement should be 
accepted in other contexts, we are convinced that it has no proper application to 
liability for design defects in motor vehicles. 272 Md. at 220-21, 321 A.2d at 747. 
The court in Young concluded that the thrust of Section 402A distinguishes between a 
"construction defect" and a "defect in design" in that Section 402A eliminates a seller's 
care from consideration while "the existence of a defective design depends upon the 
reasonableness of the manufacturer's action, and depends upon the degree of care which 
he has exercised .... ", 272 Md. at 221,321 A.2d at 747. In short, the court took a very 
literal reading of a concept that was formulated to ease the proof burden of a plaintiff by 
allowing him to rely on a kind of "enterprise liability." For a good discussion of the 
expression "enterprise liability," see McNichols, The Kirkland v. General Manufacturers' 
Products Liability Doctrine-What's In a Name?, 27 OKLA. L. REV. 347,352 (1974). 
At least twelve decisions have adopted the theory of "crashworthiness" within the 
Section 402A context. Nanda v. Ford Motor Co., 509 F.2d 213 (7th Cir. 1974) 
(applying Dlinois law); Turcotte v. Ford Motor Co., 494 F.2d 173 (1st Cir. 1974) 
(applying Rhode Island law); Passwaters v. General Motors Corp., 454 F.2d 270 (8th Cir. 
1972) (applying Iowa law); Grundmanis v. British Motor Corp., 308 F. Supp. 303 (E.D. 
Wis. 1970); Dyson v. General Motors Corp., 298 F. Supp. 1064 (E.D. Pa. 1969); Cronin 
v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972); 
Brandenburger v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 162 Mont. 506, 513 P.2d 268 
(1973); May v. Portland Jeep, Inc., 265 Ore. 307, 509 P.2d 24 (1973); Engberg v. Ford 
Motor Co., 205 N.W.2d 104 (S.D. 1973); Ellithrope v. Ford Motor Co., 503 S.W.2d 516 
(Tenn. 1973); Turner v. General Motors Corp., 514 S.W.2d 497 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974); 
Baumgardner v. American Motors Corp., 83 Wash. 2d 751, 522 P.2d 829 (1974). 
The discussion in Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., supra, illustrates the narrowness of 
the Young court's distinction: ' 
The most obvious problem we perceive in creating any such distinction 
[construction v. design] is that thereafter it would be advantageous to 
characterize a defect in one rather than the other category. It is difficult to prove 
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In concluding that a manufacturer has a "crashworthiness" duty, the 
Young court relied somewhat on the reasoning of the New York Court 
of Appeals in Balm v. Triumph Corp.,17 which predicated the existence 
of the duty on the foreseeability of the injury.iB However, in defining 
the scope of the duty, the Young court was attracted to the approach 
taken by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Dreisonstok v. 
Volkswagenwerk, A.G. 19 
The Dreisonstok court seized upon the Larsen precept that a 
"manufacturer is under a duty to use reasonable care in the design of its 
vehicle to avoid subjecting the user to an unreasonable risk of injury in 
the event of a collision. ,,20 It then explained that "[ w] hether or not 
this [creation of ~ unreasonable danger] has occurred should be 
determined by general negligence principles, which involve a balancing 
of the likelihood of harm, and the gravity of harm if it happens against 
the burden of the precautions which would be effective to avoid the 
harm.,,21 
In connection with this "balancing" approach, the Dreisonstok court 
articulated several factors to be considered: 
i. the defect's obviousness;22 
2. the vehicle's purposes, including design, utility, style, attractive-
ness and marketability;23 
that a product ultjmately caused injury because a widget was poorly welded-a 
defect in manufacture-rather than because it was made of inexpensive metal 
difficult to weld, chosen by a designer concerned with economy-a defect in 
design .... Furthermore, we find no reason why a different standard, and one 
harder to meet, should apply to defects which plague entire product lines. We 
recognize that it is more damaging to a manufacturer to have an entire line 
condemned, so to speak, for a defect in design, than a single product for a defect 
in manufacture. But the potential economic loss to a manufacturer should not be 
reflected in a different standard of proof for an injured consumer. 8 Cal. 3d at 
134,501 P.2d at 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 443. 
If Maryland should adopt Section 402A without obliterating this distinction between a 
design defect and a construction defect, the distinction will provide a defense hurdle for 
plaintiffs in design defect cases who are desirous of avoiding the negligence requisite of 
lack of due care and the vagaries of the Uniform Commercial Code's statutory scheme 
requirements and allowances. At present though, the "crash worthiness" doctrine is 
available to plaintiffs in Maryland only when their cases are premised on theories of 
negligence or implied warranty. 
17. In Young, the court quoted with approval this language from Bolm v. Triumph Corp., 33 
N.Y.2d 151,158,305 N.E.2d 769,772-73,350 N.Y.S.2d 644, 649 (1973): 
[T]he manufacturer should not be permitted to argue that a user of its product 
assumes dangers from unknown or latent defects, either iIi construction or design, 
which the manufacturer can reasonably foresee will cause injury on impact. The 
standards for imposing liability for such unreasonably dangerous design defects 
are, thus, general negligence principles .... 272 Md. at 212, 321 A.2d at 743. 
18. Id. at 219, 321 A.2d at 746. 
19. 489 F.2d 1066 (4th Cir. 1974). 
20. Id. at 1070 n.11, quoting from Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 502 (8th 
Cir. 1968) (emphasis added). 
21. 489 F.2d at 1071. 
22. Id. 
23. Id. at 1071-72. 
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3. the vehicle's price and, in particular, the effect which added 
safety features would have upon the price relative to marketability; 24 
and, 
4. the circumstances of the particular collision.25 
The Young court, mindful of these factors, pronounced: 
[I]n determining "reasonableness," many factors must be 
considered .... The style and type of vehicle, and its particular 
purpose, must be taken into consideration .... Price must be a 
pertinent factor, as the cost of a particular design change may in 
some instances be so great, while adding little to safety, that the 
vehicle will be taken "out of the price range of the market to 
which it was intended to appeal." . .. And the price of the 
vehicle itself should be considered,.... The nature of the 
accident is to be taken into account, .... [for] to impose 
liability, the trier of the facts must be able to conclude that the 
design was unreasonable in light of all of the relevant 
considerations.26 
Under Young, then, as under Dreisonstok, a manufacturer will be 
held liable for a violation of the "crashworthiness" duty only if the 
court finds-after delicately balancing the utility of the vehicle, in light 
of the above factors, against the likelihood and gravity of harm-that an 
unreasonable risk of injury exists in the event of a collision. 
THE PROTECTIVE STAGES AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 
The expression of the manufacturer's "crashworthiness" duty in 
terms of "reasonable care in the design of a vehicle in order to avoid 
subjecting a user to an unreasonable risk of injury in a collision,,27 aids 
in defining the scope of that duty. However, the questions remain: How 
safe is "crashworthy" as opposed to "crashproof"?28 Where is the line 
to be drawn? To what extent can the courts expand the "crashworthi-
ness" duty and yet maintain sensibility on liability for enhanced injury? 
The problem can be analyzed in terms of the "three-stage protective 
barrier" generally offered a vehicle occupant for purposes of isolating 
him from direct confrontation with excessive impact forces. These 
three stages of protection have been aptly described as follows in an 
engineering paper: 
24. [d. at 1072-73. 
25. [d. at 1073. For the court's application of the articulated factors, see 489 F.2d at 
1073-76. 
26. 272 Md. at 219, 312 A.2d at 746-47. See also Turner v. General Motors Corp., 514 
S.W.2d 497, 504-05 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974). 
27. 272 Md. at 219, 321 A.2d at 746. 
28. One author believes the distinction is one of semantics since both terms are undefinable 
in practical terms-he explains: 
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The first stage relates to the crushable structure ahead, behind, 
to the sides and below the motorist which serves to defonn and 
resist passenger compartment intrusion. The padded surfaces, 
energy absorbing controls and interior trim constitute the 
second stage forces .... the third protective barrier is provided 
by internal restraints positioned about the motorist for the 
purpose of directing and attenuating the forces of the second 
collision, the impact exposure of the motorist with his vehicle 
interior.29 
7 
In considering the reasonableness of care in design of each of these 
"protective barriers," the courts should realize that "[ t Jhe realities of 
the crash environment are such that cars collide in every conceivable 
manner, at all conceivable speeds, with all conceivable objects." 30 
Consequently, if the judicial process is to function in this area, it is 
suggested that the courts adhere closely to the refined approach set out 
in Dreisonstok. 31 Otherwise, the manufacturer does become an insurer 
of his product, since every automobile, practically speaking, can 
arguably be made safer vis-a-vis its perfonnance in a collision. 
THE FIRST STAGE-STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY 
It is pertinent to note that comprehensive safety standards are 
beginning to have an effect on maintaining passenger compartment 
integrity within the state of the art. For example, there are now 
standards on roof crush resistance, fuel system integrity, capacity of 
If "defectiveness" of a car is to be judged by its performance in a collision then 
every car is arguably "defective" in some way since one can always contend in 
retrospect that it could have been "safer," depending on the circumstances. The 
realities of the crash environment are such that cars collide in every con~eivable 
manner, at all conceivable speeds, with all conceivable objects. Any given crash or 
accident can generate a claim, for example, that the front end should have been 
more rigid in the one case and more crushable in the other; that seats should have 
been firmly anchored in one case and able to collapse in another case; that fuel 
tanks should be located in front in one case, in the rear in another and at the side 
in still another. The examples could be multiplied. A car equipped with a lap and 
shoulder belt not in use will be claimed to be "crash worthy" because it was not 
equipped with airbags. If a manufacturer made a car which withstood a 40 mile an 
hour frontal collision without any injury, there would be those who would claim 
lack of "second collision" protection in a crash at 41 miles per hour, or at higher 
speeds, and so on. Thus, given the wide variety and numbers of claims which can, 
and, in fact, have been made, a general duty to protect against "second collision" 
injuries is on a cumulative basis, really a duty to make a "crashproof" car. Hoenig, 
Understanding "Second Collision" Cases in New York; A Suggested Guide to the 
Application of Bolm, 20 N.Y.L.F. 29, 46-47, n.53 (1974) [hereinafter cited as 
Hoenig]. 
29. Severy, Brink & Blaisdell, Smaller Vehicle Versus Larger Vehicle Collisions, S.A.E. Paper 
No. 710861 (1971) in Proceedings of the Fifteenth Stapp Car Crash Conference 386, 
428-49 (1971). 
30. Extracted from Hoenig, supra note 28, at 46, n.53. 
31. 489 F.2d at 1071·73. 
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door locks and door retention components, side door strength and 
windshield mounting.32 These will assist in eliminating the potential 
for an anomaly when, for example, a plaintiff contends that a fuel tank 
located in the vehicle front is a frontal crash hazard and therefore 
should be in the rear,33 while another plaintiff contends that because 
of the high incidence of rear-end collisions the fuel tank should be 
placed somewhere in the vehicle front. 34 
Uniform safety standards, while certainly desirable, do not eliminate, 
however, the need for judicial concern with the variables involved in 
various types of accidents. One important variable in particular requires 
realistic judicial attention: the circumstances of the particular collision. 
Cases in several jurisdictions have emphasized the need for limitations 
on this variable.35 
In Dyson v. General Motors Corp., 36 the plaintiff was injured when 
the 1965 Buick Electra hardtop in which she was a passenger left the 
roadway and overturned onto its roof. The plaintiff charged in her 
complaint, which was silent on vehicle speed, that the vehicle was 
defectively designed because of the removal in that year's model of the 
center posts, the reduction in the door frame and the change in angle of 
the corner roof-supports. She further contended that these defects so 
weakened the roof struct.ure that the roof collapsed completely when 
the vehicle overturned. The court, while not dismissing the complaint 
because of a prediction that Pennsylvania's highest state court would 
follow the Larsen rationale and because there could conceivably be 
liability for the particular defective condition alleged,37 did instruc-
tively state: 
[I]t could not reasonably be argued that a car manufacturer 
should be held liable because its vehicle collapsed when involved 
in a head-on collision with a large truck, at high speed.38 
32. 49 C.F.R. §§ 571.216, .301, .206, .214 and .212 (1974), respectively. 
33. See Shumard v. General Motors Corp., 270 F. Supp. 311 (S.D. Ohio 1967) (plaintiff's 
decedent received fatal injuries when his 1962 Corvair became involved in a head-on 
collision with another vehicle and burning gasoline escaped from a crushed fuel tank 
located in the front-placement of the fuel tank was attacked). 
34. See Grundmanis v. British Motor Corp., 308 F. Supp. 303 (E.D. Wis. 1970) (plaintiff 
received injuries when the 1962 MGB in which the plaintiff was a passenger became 
involved in a collision with another vehicle and fire emerged from the ruptured fuel 
tank-placement of the fuel tank under the trunk and immediately behind the passenger 
compartment was questioned). 
35. Nanda v. Ford Motor Co., 509 F.2d .213 (7th Cir. 1974); Dreisonstok v. Volkswagen-
werk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066 (4th Cir. 1974); Dyson v. General Motors Corp., 298 F. 
Supp. 1064 (E.D. Pa. 1969); Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Young, 272 Md. 201, 321 
A.2d 737 (1974); Turner v. General Motors Corp., 514 S.W.2d 497 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1974). All five follow the rationale as set forth in Larsen. 
36. 298 F. Supp. 1064 (E.D. Pa. 1969). 
37. The trend is that a plaintiff's claim will not simply be barred because it involves a 
"second collision;" the issue has become whether there could conceivably be liability for 
the particular defective condition allegedly involved. 
38. 298 F. Supp. at 1073. 
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The court had noted with respect to the case as presented that" [t] here 
is no evidence or allegation as to the speed of the vehicle when it left 
the roadway .... ,,39 
In Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G.,40 a case in which a 1968 
Microbus collided with a utility pole at 40 mph, the court, in reversing 
a judgment for the plaintiff, commented: 
It may be that in every case the injuries may be somewhat 
different but any "head-on" collision at a speed of 40 miles an 
hour or more will result in severe injuries to the occupants of a 
vehicle and, certainly in 1968, no design short of an impractical 
and exorbitantly expensive tank-like vehicle could have pro-
tected against such injuries; in fact, it is doubtful that even such 
a vehicle could have.41 
Two other cases, Turner v. General Motors Corp. ,42 and Nanda v. 
Ford Motor CO.,43 have implicitly approved the Dreisonstok approach. 
In Turner, plaintiff was operating a 1969 Chevrolet Impala hardtop 
sedan when, in order to avoid striking a truck, he left the highway and 
the vehicle overturned and landed on its top. Plaintiff was seatbelted, 
but the right front portion of the roof collapsed and came into contact 
with his head, resulting in paralysis of his limbs. He sued the 
manufacturer alleging design deficiency in connection with the roof 
structural support and suggested incorporation of a roll bar as an 
alternative. The court, indicating that the plaintiff should be permitted 
further trial court proceedings, seemed in agreement with the balancing 
test criteria of Dreisonstok, which it termed a "moderate approach ... 
to the issue of crashworthiness. ,,44 
The Nanda court, while not verbalizing the Dreisonstok criteria for 
determining unreasonable risk and resultant liability, implicitly recog-
nized the role of speed for purposes of calculating collision forces in 
39. Id. The court continued, " ... and I must therefore assume, for present purposes, that no 
greater force was exerted upon the roof than the weight of the vehicle itself, as it came 
to rest upside·down on a lawn." Id. 
40. 489 F.2d 1066 (4th Cir. 1974). 
41. Id. at 1076 (citations omitted). ct. Seattle·First National Bank v. Volkswagen of 
America, Inc., 11 Wash. App. 929, 525 P.2d 286 (1974). In this case, occupants of a 
1958 Volkswagen Microbus were fatally injured when it collided with the rear of a Ford 
flatbed truck. Plaintiffs alleged defective design relative to the structural integrity of the 
vehicle's front end. The court refused to dismiss on the basis of Dreisonstok, 
distinguishing that case by saying: "In the present case we do not have a speed of 
40 m.p.h., but an alleged speed of 20 m.p.h. or less." Id. at 935, 525 P.2d at 290. 
42. 514 S.W.2d 497 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974). 
43. 509 F.2d 213 (7th Cir. 1974). 
44. 514 S.W.2d at 505. The Turner court· stated, after reviewing the resident federal court's 
decision in Willis v. Chrysler Corp., 264 F. Supp. 1010, 1011·12 (S.D. Tex. 1967), which 
had predicted Texas would adopt the Evans rationale as the law of Texas: "[W]e do not 
believe that Larsen imposes a duty to design an automobile which will withstand the 
type of high-speed, head-on collision described in Willis." 514 S.W.2d at 502. 
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order to assess design tolerance capability. 45 However, because of clear 
factual evidence conflicts on pertinent factors, the jury's plaintiff 
verdict governed inferences.46 The plaintiff's 1967 Ford Cortina had 
been rear-ended twice during the accident and the vehicle had burst 
into flames. An eyewitness had estimated 10 mph for the first impact; 
the driver of the second impacting vehicle indicated she was traveling 
40 mph when she first observed the Ford Cortina, but she further 
indicated that she had braked before impact and had felt her brakes 
grab. 
The Maryland Court of Appeals has also emphasized the "nature of 
the accident,"47 and in particular, the speed aspect. Of course, the 
"nature of the accident" includes not only speed but also consideration 
of the masses involved-car with car (size differentials),48 car with 
fixed barrier (for example, with a concrete bridge abutment),49 or even 
car with another type of moving object (train),50-and the collision 
types, such as frontal,51 rear-end52 or, possibly, rollover.53 
Pertinent to other balancing criteria, Dyson intimates and Dreison-
stok pronounces that, for purposes of determining defective design, 
vehicles of the same type are to be compared. Dyson explains: 
[A]ll that is involved is differentiation between various models 
of automobiles, and a recognition of the inherent characteristics 
of each. The manufacturer cannot be expected to provide a 
convertible which is as safe in roll-over accidents as a standard 
four-door sedan with center posts and full-door frames. But the 
45. 509 F.2d at 218. 
46. Id. at 220. 
47. 272 Md. at 219, 321 A.2d at 747. 
48. Johnson v. American Motors Corp., 225 N.W.2d 57 (N.D. 1974) (Cadillac rear-ends 
R;!mbler station wagon); Seattle-First National Bank v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 11 
Wash. App. 800, 525 P.2d 286 (1974) (Microbus rear-ends flatbed truck). 
49. Hardy v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 65 F.R.D. 359 (W.D. Pa. 1975). 
50. Alexander v. Seaboard Air Line R.R., 346 F. Supp. 320 (W.D.N.C. 1971), aff'd per 
curiam, [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH PROD. LIAB. REP. 11 6748 (4th Cir. 1972). See 
also Walz v. Erie-Lackawanna R.R., [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] CCH PROD. LIAB. REP. 
11 5722 (N.D. Ind. 1967). 
51. Bremier v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 340 F. Supp. 949 (D.D.C. 1972); Hardy v. 
Volkswagen of America, Inc., 65 F.R.D. 359 (W.D. Pa. 1975); Willis v. Chrysler Corp., 
264 F. Supp. 1010 (S.D. Tex. 1967); Ford v. Rupple, 161 Mont. 56, 504 P.2d 686 
(1972). 
52. Nanda v. Ford Motor Co., 509 F.2d 213 (7th Cir. 1974); Perez v. Ford Motor Co., 497 
F.2d 82 (5th Cir. 1974); Turcotte v. Ford Motor Co., 494 F.2d 173 (1st Cir. 1974); 
Badorek v. General Motors Corp., 11 Cal. App. 3d 902, 90 Cal. Rptr. 305 (1970); 
Evancho v. Thiel, 297 So. 2d 40 (Fla. App. 1974); Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. 
Young, 272 Md. 201, 321 A.2d 737 (1974); Johnson v. American Motors Corp., 225 
N.W.2d 57 (N.D. 1974). 
53. See Dyson v. General Motors Corp., 298 F. Supp. 1064 (E.D. Pa. 1969); Culpepper v. 
Volkswagen of America, Inc., 33 Cal. App. 3d 510, 109 Cal. Rptr. 110 (1973); 
Frericks v. General Motors Corp., 274 Md. 288, 336 A.2d 118 (1975); May v. Portland 
Jeep, Inc., 265 Ore. 307, 509 P.2d 24 (1973); Turner v. General Motors Corp., 514 
S.W.2d 497 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974). 
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manufacturer can be expected to provide a convertible which is 
as safe as it reasonably can be made, and which is not 
appreciably less safe than other convertibles. 54 
Dreisonstok adds: 
[I] n determining whether a vehicle has been negligently 
designed so far as safety is concerned, the special purpose and 
character of the particular type of vehicle must be considered, 
and a microbus is no more to be compared with a standard 
1966 passenger type car than the convertible instanced in 
Dyson is to be compared with a standard hardtop passenger 
car.55 
11 
Moreover, the vehicle's purposes and the vehicle's price should act as 
the guidelines for selection of the comparison mode1.56 
Nonetheless, the collision's nature should be the most persuasive 
factor, a conclusion patently compelled by the recent decisions 
discussed supra. Also, the judicial process, in examining this factor, 
must make serious efforts to prevent liability from attaching to 
collisions beyond the contemplation of the federal standards. Other-
wise, the automobile manufacturer, practically speaking, will become 
the insurer of his product.57 
THE SECOND STAGE-
PASSENGER COMPARTMENT INTERIOR COMPONENTS 
Product liability litigation has no doubt contributed in part to the 
improved protection now afforded passenger compartment occupants 
from potential aggravated injuries resulting from steering assemblies, 
dashboard protrusions, seat mechanism characteristics, and other 
passenger compartment components by hastening the process through 
which federal safety standard requirements have become applicable to 
manufacturers. 58 Passengers in automobiles involved in accidents now 
have improved protection from potential aggravated injuries. 
For example, the Mississippi trilogy,59 while decided in favor of the 
manufacturer based on the Evans interpretation of duty, undoubtedly 
54. 298 F. Supp. at 1073. 
55. 489 F.2d at 1076. 
56. [d. at 1071-73. 
57. [d. at 1076. 
58. See discussion at p. 6-7 supra. 
59. General Motors Corp. v. Howard, 244 So. 2d 726 (Miss. 1971) (occupant's aggravated 
injury concerned a telescopic steering column which did not telescope in collision with 
another truck); Ford Motor Co. v. Simpson, 233 So. 2d 797 (Miss. 1970) (occupant of a 
pick-up truck involved in a head-on collision was injured when her knee struck a heater 
knob attached to the bottom of the dashboard); and, Walton v. Chrysler Corp., 229 So. 
2d 568 (Miss. 1969) (occupant received enhanced injuries when his seat belt collapsed in 
a rear-end collision). 
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assisted in focusing attention on passenger compartment interior needs. 
Similarly, cases in various jurisdictions involving the characteristics of 
steering assemblies have heightened the debate, for example, over the 
merits of a collapsible or non-rigid column.60 Also, the cases dealing 
with seat rigidity and seat-locking devices have certainly caused 
engineers to focus on the need to find the optimum safety standard for 
the subject.61 
In fact, uniform safety standards, objective and practicable, are a 
needed item for the design of all safety related interior components of a 
vehicle. Gray v. General Motors Corp. 62 is an illustration of the reason 
for the need. There the plaintiff sued the manufacturer for failure to 
install a "pop-out" windshield, alleging that her injuries were enhanced 
when she was thrown through the windshield in a collision. However, 
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 21263 requires that windshield 
mounting be retained in a 30 mph forward crash into a rigid concrete 
barrier, thereby pronouncing the view that a windshield should not 
"pop-out." 
Comprehensive safety standards for all components involved with the 
passenger compartment interior would narrow litigation in this area to a 
manufacturer's non-compliance with the standards promulgated.64 The 
judicial process then would be dealing only with specific and objective 
levels of performance by which to gauge potential liability, a task for 
which the system is traditionally well-suited. 
60. In Yetter v. Raj eski , 364 F. Supp. 105 (D.N.J. 1973), plaintiff included an allegation 
that the 1965 vehicle should have been equipped with a coUapsible steering column 
("E-A' , column) not found in any 1965 production vehicle. Interestingly, a study 
prepared for the Department of Transportation found through comparisons of accident 
collision performance among vehicles not having the E-A column and those with the 
energy absorbing device that in some injury classifications there was an increase in injury 
attributable to the device. T. Anderson, Analysis of Vehicle Injury Sources, Cornell 
Aeronautical Laboratory Report No. ZM-5010·V-2R (Rev. Sept. 1972). 
61. Cf. Walton v. Chrysler Corp., 229 So. 2d 568 (Miss. 1969), where plaintiff complained 
that seats collapsed in collision and Seattle First National Bank v. Talbert, [1970-73 
Transfer Binder] CCH PROD. LIAB. REP. ~ 6550 (Wash. Sup. Ct. 1970), where plaintiff 
complained that seats remained rigidly anchored during the collision. 
62. 434 F.2d 110 (8th Cir. 1970) (plaintiff failed to recover). 
63. 49 C.F.R. § 571.212 (1974). 
64. Standards have already been promulgated concerning rearview mirrors (49 C.F.R. 
§ 571.111 (1974», interior padding (49 C.F.R. § 511.201 (1974», steering (49 C.F.R. 
§ 571.204 (1974», and seating systems (49 C.F.R. § 571.207 (1974». 
Other interior component second collision cases include: Ford Motor Co. v. Zahn, 
265 F.2d 729 (8th Cir. 1959) (occupant struck defectively jagged ashtray during 
emergency braking); Evancho v. Thiel, 297 So. 2d 40 (Fla. App. 1974) (front seat 
locking device failed and exposed forward moving rear seat passenger to sharp edges of 
rails upon which the seat was mounted); Friend v. General Motors Corp., 118 Ga. App. 
763, 165 S.E.2d 734 (1968), cert. denied, 225 Ga. 290, 167 S.E.2d 926 (1969) (folding 
of front seat when rear of seat struck); Mickle v. Blackmon, 252 S.C. 202, 166 S.E.2d 
173 (1969) (gear shift lever knob shattering and impaling occupant); and Ellithrope v. 
Ford Motor Co., 503 S.W.2d 516 (Tenn. 1973) (occupant's face struck prongs of insignia 
on steering wheel when vehicle rear-ended). 
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THE THIRD STAGE-oCCUP ANT SAFETY DEVICES 
It is generally conceded that when a safety device designed to protect 
an occupant in the event of a crash fails to perform as intended due to 
an inherent defect, an action for "enhanced injury" is certainly 
permissible, regardless of whether the particular jurisdiction follows the 
Evans or Larsen rule. 6s 
A review of a few cases illustrates the handling of the focal issue-
[W]hether a defect unknown to the user created a condition 
which prevented or interfered with the ability of the safety 
device to do its intended job.66 
In Engberg v. Ford Motor Co., 67 plaintiff's decedent received fatal 
injuries due to ejection during a single vehicle accident because of an 
apparently defective seat belt. The seat belt had been found buckled 
but broken; there had been no evidence of blood in the vehicle; and, 
the passenger compartment had remained essentially intact after the 
accident. The defect evidence showed that the seat belt, designed to 
withstand a load of 5000 pounds, failed to perform under a 
significantly lower load because of inadequate materials used for the 
belt webbing. The Supreme Court of South Dakota, affirming the trial 
court judgment (jury verdict) in favor of the plaintiff, stated: 
[T]he seat belts in Engberg's station wagon were provided for 
the specific purpose of protecting the driver in the event of an 
accident. The evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that if 
the seat belt had performed as reasonably expected of it, 
Engberg's injuries would not have been so severe.68 
In Ruddell v. Levin, 69 plaintiff's decedent received fatal injuries 
because his head was driven into the protruding edge of a head restraint 
when his vehicle was rear-ended while stopped on a bridge. The court, 
noting that "the only 'intended use' of the head restraint was to 
provide occupant protection in the event of rear-end collisions," 70 
concluded on the existence of a manufacturer's duty 7l to the 
decedent, that: 
65. See, e.g., Huddell v. Levin, 395 F. Supp. 64 (D.N.J. 1975). 
66. Hoenig, supra note 28, at 52·53. 
67. 205 N.W.2d 104 (S.D. 1973). 
68. 205 N.W.2d at 108. See also Devaney v. Sarno, 125 N.J. Super. 414, 311 A.2d 208 (App. 
Div. 1973), aff'd 65 N.J. 235, 323 A.2d 449 (1974); Baumgardner v. American Motors 
Corp., 83 Wash.2d 751,522 P.2d 829 (1974). 
69. 395 F. Supp. 64 (D.N.J. 1975). 
70. [d. at 73. 
71. The court also noted that "the decision need not be based on the broad theories of 
'second collision' case law." [d. 
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It would be illogical to hold . . . that a manufacturer has no 
duty to provide a non-defective head restraint because its 
"intended use" does not contemplate passenger movement after 
forceful accidents.72 
Looking then at the sufficiency of the evidence for purposes of 
deciding the post-trial motion of the manufacturer, the court, indicat-
ing agreement that "plaintiff's testimony amply demonstrated that the 
head restraint was defective,,,73 stated, in summary: 
Because the soft foam provided little protection, a rearward 
motion of the head would bring it into contact with the sharp 
"ax-like" metal edge of the head restraint, which concentrated 
all forces against a one-half inch area of the skull; the metal 
edge itself was not easily deformable, so that there was no 
"cushioning" effect.74 
In May v. Portland Jeep, Inc.,75 plaintiff, who was wearing his 
seatbelt, sustained injuries when his jeep vehicle landed upside down 
while descending a sand dike and a roll bar, which was bolted to wheel 
wells welded to the vehicle body, collapsed. The Supreme Court of 
Oregon affirmed the trial court judgment (jury verdict) in favor of the 
plaintiff indicating that there was sufficient evidence that the roll bar 
should have withstood the load. The court also concluded that "second 
collision" cases "are not applicable to situations where the defect is in 
equipment, the sole purpose of which is to protect occupants from 
injury in the case of accident."76 
Each of the above case examples involved a defect which was 
unknown to the user and which created a condition that prevented or 
interfered with the ability of the safety device to fulfill its intended 
purpose. In each case a jury's finding of manufacturer liability was 
affirmed by the court principally because a device provided to 
accomplish a specific safety task should achieve performance goals 
contemplated by the manufacturer, a fact belied by the evidence. 
Conceivably, another type of example which may result in the future 
will involve an "airbag,,77 which does not inflate despite being designed 
to inflate upon a crash and restrain the occupant. In any event, the 
72.Id. 
73. Id. at 75. 
74.Id. 
75. 265 Ore. 307, 509 P.2d 24 (1973). 
76. Id. at 312, 509 P.2d at 27. See also Turner v. General Motors Corp., 514 S.W.2d 497 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1974). 
77. "An 'airbag' is a passive inflatable occupant restraint system." Upon a collision, an 
explosive gas charge rapidly inflates "a large bag which restrains the occupant as he 
moves toward the windshield, dashboard or steering wheel of the car and then deflates 
itself." The performance cycle is to restrain the occupant from impact with the vehicle 
interior. Chrysler Corp. v. Department of Trans., 472 F.2d 659, 664 (6th Cir. 1972). 
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judicial system can adequately handle this aspect of "crashworthiness" 
so long as it does not attempt to set design standards for occupant 
safety devices which are inconsistent with the function that the design 
for the particular device is intended to serve. 
A NEW DIMENSION 
Although the term "crashworthiness" is generally used to connote 
the capability which an automobile has to protect its occupants during 
a collision, 78 the term is equally applicable to the protection of 
non-occupants colliding with an automobile, for example, pedestrians, 
motorcyclists, and bicyclists. 79 The feature involved is exterior design. 
Of course, "crashworthiness" for non-occupants must take into 
account the fact that safety of the vehicle's occupants must be a prime 
design concern. Therefore, for example, a rigid outer shell would seem a 
requirement even though it would inevitably cause serious injury or 
even death to a non-occupant hit in a high-speed collision.80 The 
Eighth Circuit in Passwaters v. General Motors Corp. 81 was again the 
court setting the trend to allow enhanced injury recovery by non-
occupants. 
78. See note 1 supra. 
79. Also occupants of another vehicle may be an additional example. But see Mieher v. 
Brown, 54 Ill. 2d 539, 301 N.E.2d 307 (1973). In Mieher, the plaintiff's decedent's 
automobile collided with the rear end of a truck and the car's front passed underneath 
the truck's rear deck, resulting in the rear deck penetrating the car's windshield and 
causing fatal injuries to the plaintiff. The plaintiff's representative alleged that the truck's 
manufacturer negligently designed its product by failing to attach to the rear a bumper, 
fender or shield, thereby rendering the truck unsafe in the event that a vehicle colliding 
with the truck's rear could then proceed unimpeded under the truck's bed. However, the 
Mieher court held: 
Although the injury complained of may have been, in a sense, foreseeable, we do 
not consider that the alleged defective design created an unreasonable danger or 
an unreasonable risk of injury .... Public policy and the social requirements do 
not require that a duty be placed upon the manufacturer of this truck to design 
his vehicle so as to prevent injuries from the extraordinary occurrences of this 
case. [d. at 545,301 N.E.2d at 310. 
80. One commentator indicates two beliefs as to improvements: 
Two aspects of current exterior design can, however, be made safer without 
sacrificing other important interests. The first of these is the presence of 
force-concentrating structures-small, sharp surfaces, such as chrome trim or hood 
ornaments-on the exposed surfaces of the automobile .... In most cases there is 
no functional need for these structures;.... The second aspect... is the 
geometry, or over-all shape, of the automobile's front end. The front-end 
geometry determines the direction in which the body of a pedestrian will be 
thrown after the initial impact .... No definitive information is now available 
regarding which geometry provides maximum protection for pedestrians, and 
more study of the question is needed. Note, The Automobile Manufacturer's 
Liability to Pedestrians for Exterior Design: New Dimensions in "Crashworthi-
ness, " 71 MICH. L. REV. 1654, 1655-56 (1973). 
81. 454 F.2d 1270 (8th Cir. 1972) cited in Young, 272 Md. at 214, 321 A.2d at 744. ct. 
Hatch v. Ford Motor Co., 163 Cal. App.2d 393, 329 P.2d 605 (1958) (where a pointed 
hood ornament over nine inches long pierced the eye of a six-year-old boy who ran into a 
parked car) and Kahn v. Chrysler Corp., 221 F. Supp. 677 (S.D. Tex. 1963) (where a 
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In Passwaters, the plaintiff was a passenger on a motorcycle which 
collided with a Buick Skylark. Her leg was severely lacerated when it 
came into contact with a wheel cover of the car. The wheel cover 
consisted of unshielded metal flypers that spun when the wheel rotated. 
Plaintiff contended that the protruding blades moving at high speeds in 
an unshielded area constituted an unsafe design. The district court had 
directed a verdict for the manufacturer at the close of all the 
evidence.82 The Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded for a new trial, 
holding: 
We conclude that although the specific injury and the manner in 
which it occurred may have been difficult to foresee, neverthe-
less the unshielded operation of propeller-like blades on the 
four wheels of an automobile created a high risk of foreseeable 
harm to the general public. The use of the highways by 
pedestrians, the frequency of travel by unprotected persons 
riding on bicycles, motorbikes and motorcycles is a common 
occurrence. We think it now settled that a manufacturer does 
have the responsibility to avoid design in automobiles which can 
reasonably be foreseen as initially causing or aggravating serious 
injury to users of the highway when a collision occurS.83 
The Passwaters court sidestepped its earlier post-Larsen decision of 
Schneider u. Chrysler Corp.84 In Schneider, the plaintiff, while bending 
over, lacerated his eye on a sharp corner of the glass of the operied left 
front vent window of his automobile. The court found a lack of 
proximate causation, reasoning that the plaintiff's conduct was not a 
foreseeable action which the manufacturer could reasonably anticipate. 
In distinguishing Schneider, the Passwaters court stated: 
[I]n Schneider the Court reasoned that the window vent was 
not being used for its intended purpose. Here the wheel cover 
was obviously used as it was intended.85 
seven-year-old boy who rode his bicycle into the rear of a car was thrown upon an 
ornamental tail fin and incurred serious injuries). Both Hatch and Kahn held the 
manufacturer owed no duty-;-eflective of a court reluctance to extend the scope of the 
manufacturer's duty to include exterior design-caused injuries where the plaintiff collides 
with a stationary vehicle. 
82. The district court had "found that the wheel cover had been engineered to that degree of 
safety which rendered unforeseeable an injury to a person riding on the rear of a 
motorcycle." 454 F.2d at 1274. 
83. 454 F.2d at 1275-76. Interestingly, the trial after remand of Passwaters resulted in the 
jury returning a defendant's verdict. 
84. 401 F.2d 549 (8th Cir. 1968). 
85. 454 F.2d at 1275. The Passwaters court also noted Schneider's comparison of Hatch v. 
Ford Motor Co., 163 Cal. App. 2d 393; 329 P.2d 605 (1958): 
We think significant the court's comment in Schneider where it observed: "The 
accident in Hatch appears much more foreseeable than the one in the case at bar 
and raises a close question on the use of a needlessly protruding ornament as 
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Passwaters and Schneider, as Eighth Circuit post-Larsen decisions, 
appear inconsistent unless one distinguishes Schneider from Larsen and 
Passwaters for not being a "second collision" case, but rather a 
"simultaneous collision" situation, that is, one where the injury caused 
by the design happens simultaneously with the collision.86 However, 
this distinction seems meaningless when one remembers that the duty 
being imposed upon the manufacturer is to use reasonable care in 
design to minimize the injurious effects of an accident. 87 
Federal regulation of exterior design is minimal to date,88 but 
comprehensive safety standards are a likely response to the consumer 
awareness of causes of accident-producing injuries.89 The promulgation 
of standards which would eliminate unreasonably dangerous exterior 
designs would be the most effective means of affording non-occupants 
protection in vehicle collisions. In the meantime, litigants must deal 
with the "unreasonable risk of injury in the event of a collision" 
standard. 
A DEFENSE REVIVED 
In reaching its indicated reliance on "traditional rules of negligence," 
the Maryland court in Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Young firmly 
enunciated its belief that Larsen, and its progeny, are " ... in accord 
with traditional negligence principles .... "90 On the extent of 
manufacturer liability in "crashworthiness" cases, the Larsen court 
stated: 
[T]he manufacturer should be liable for that portion of the 
damage or injury caused by the defective design over and above 
the damage or injury that probably would have occurred as a 
result of the impact or collision absent the defective design. 91 
distinguished from an essential protrusion of an opened vent window. (Emphasis 
ours) 401 F.2d at 558." 454 F.2d at 1275. 
86. There are other cases that fall into this category. E.g., Kahn v. Chrysler Corp., 221 F 
Supp. 677 (S.D. Tex. 1963); Hatch v. Ford Motor Co., 163 Cal. App. 2d 393, 329 P.2d 
605 (1968). See also Ford Motor Co. v. Zahn, 265 F.2d 729 (8th Cir. 1959) (a passengel 
in a car that made a sudden stop lost vision in one eye as a result of the collision of hi~ 
head with the sharp jagged edges of an ash tray). 
87. See·Green v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 485 F.2d 430 (6th Cir. 1973) (where an 
eleven-year-old girl's right ring finger was severed by a concealed piece of sharp metal 
when that finger became caught in a body vent of a parked bus-type vehicle-the court, 
after reviewing Michigan law and citing Larsen, remanded the case for a trial). 
88. 49 C.F.R. § 571.211 (1974): "Purpose and Scope. This standard precludes the use of 
wheel nuts, wheel discs, and hub caps that constitute a hazard to pedestrians and 
cyclists." The standard was not applicable to Passwaters since it was not in effect until 
1968-a 1964 Buick Skylark was the subject of Passwaters. 
89. These exterior design requirements will no doubt be similar to the existing comprehen-
sive safety regulation of interior design. See note 63 supra. 
90. 272 Md. at 214-15, 321 A.2d at 744. 
91. 391 F.2d at 503 (emphasis added). 
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It is therefore submitted that the counterpart of the manufacturer's 
enhanced liability-the plaintiff's mitigation duty vis-a-vis available 
safety restraint devices-has been revitalized. 
In Cierpisz u. Singleton,92 the Maryland Court of Appeals was first 
confronted with the "seat belt defense." After extensively quoting 
from a Wisconsin case,93 the Cierpisz court stated: 
We do not adopt, at this time, the Wisconsin court's statement 
that "an occupant of an automobile either knows or should 
know of the additional safety factor produced by the use of 
seatbelts. ,,94 
The Cierpisz court then indicates that it was persuaded "for the present 
at least,,95 by a commentator's statement to the effect that the social 
utility of using seat belts was not yet clear in the mind of the public 
and that such must occur before failure to use could be considered 
negligence.96 Nevertheless, while clearly intimating that in any event 
the defense would not be of the negligence per se character or, standing 
alone, even amount to contributory negligence, the Cierpisz court 
inferred in dictum that it might be considered in assessing damages: 
Some future case in which the availability of the belt will be 
known to the plaintiff and in which there will be evidence 
indicating the failure to use it was a substantial factor in 
producing or aggravating the plaintiff's injuries may require us 
to consider holding that the issue, with proper instructions, 
ought to be submitted to ajury.97 
The federal govemment98 and automobile industry emphasis on use of 
both lap belts and shoulder harnesses since 1967 makes it now 
reasonably certain that automobile passengers either know or should 
know that seat belts are available, and that their use produces an 
additional safety factor. 
In Spier u. Barker,99 the New York Court of Appeals held that 
where the plaintiff, who was not using an available seat belt, was 
ejected from her vehicle during the collision: 
92. 247 Md. 215, 230 A.2d 629 (1967). See also 27 MD. L. REV. 437 (1967). 
93. Bentzler v. Braun, 34 Wis. 2d 362, 149 N.W.2d 626 (1967). 
94. 247 Md. at 226, 230 A.2d at 635. 
95. [d. 
96. Roethe, Seat Belt Negligence in Automobile Accidents, 1967 WISC. L. REV. 288, 290. 
97. 247 Md. at 227, 230 A.2d at 635. But see Rogers v. Frush, 257 Md. 233, 262 A.2d 549 
(1970), where the court rejected proposed evidence relating to how a motorcyclist's 
injuries in an accident were aggravated because he failed to wear a protective helmet. [d. 
at 240-42, 262 A.2d at 553. 
98. See 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 (1974). 
99. 35 N.Y.2d 444, 323 N.E.2d 164,363 N.Y.S.2d 916 (1974). 
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[N]on-use of an available seat belt, and expert testimony in 
regard thereto, is a factor which the jury may consider, ... in 
arriving at its determination as to whether the plaintiff has 
exercised due care, not only to avoid injury to himself, but to 
mitigate any injury he would likely sustain. tOO 
19 
The Spier court then made clear its directive, which coincides with the 
dictum in Cierpisz: 
[T]he plaintiff's non-use of an available seat belt should be 
strictly limited to the jury's determination of the plaintiff's 
damages and should not be considered by the triers of fact in 
resolving the issue of liability. tOt 
Moreover, for purposes of the "two sides of the coin" thesis for 
"crashworthiness" cases, the viability of the seat belt defense with 
respect to mitigation of damages should be considered implicit in 
Young, which recognized that: 
While the intended purpose of an automobile may not be to 
participate in collisions, the intended purpose includes provid-
ing a reasonable measure of safety when, inevitably, collisions 
do occur. For many years automobiles have been equipped with 
safety glass, bumpers, windshield wipers, etc. More recently, ... 
automobiles are equipped with additional safety devices such as 
seat belts, shoulder harnesses, padded dashboards, padded 
visors, non-protruding knobs, etc. Frequent collisions are 
foreseeable, and the intended purpose of all these parts of the 
vehicle is to afford reasonable safety when those collisions 
occur. t02 
Also, as one annotator observed: 
[AJ seat belt is designed to protect against injury from the 
"second collision" resulting when the body of the occupant 
suddenly accelerated or decelerated by the impact of the first 
collision, comes in contact with the interior of the vehicle in 
which he is riding. !O3 
It would, therefore, seem illogical to cast liability upon an automobile 
manufacturer for an occupant's collisions with its product's interior 
100. ld. at 449·50, 323 N.E.2d at 167, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 920. 
101. ld. at 450, 323 N.E.2d at 167,363 N.Y.S.2d at 920. 
102. 272 Md. at 217, 321 A.2d at 745 (emphasis added). C(. Ellithorpe v. Ford Motor Co., 
503 S.W.2d 516 (Tenn. 1973), which applied a Tennessee statute foreclosing the use of 
the seat belt defense. 
103. Annot., 15 A.L.R.3d 1428, 1430-31 (1966) (emphasis added). 
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when an available safety device-for example, a seat belt-could prevent 
or minimize the resulting injuries. l04 Thus, if the manufacturer is to be 
held liable for aggravated injuries to a plaintiff caused by the failure of 
the manufacturer to make the automobile in which the plaintiff is an 
occupant reasonably safe in a collision, it seems only logical and fair 
that the failure of a plaintiff to utilize safety devices made available by 
the manufacturer should dictate mitigation of damages. 
ANOTHER CONTEXT 
"Crashworthiness" as a concept has arisen within the context of 
automobile manufacturer liability, but it should not be considered sui 
generis to the automobile industry. Potential liability for "enhanced 
injury" should attach to any manufacturer that markets a product 
containing a defect which is a substantial factor in injury aggravation in 
an accident not caused by the defect. 
Young's breadth of scope, derived from Larsen and its followers, 
may be overlooked by those who feel its holding is limited to 
automobile design cases. The duty extends to all manufacturers and a 
limitless myriad of products-trains, boats, motorcycles, go-carts, 
bicycles, elevators, toys, and others. After all, the point is that a 
manufacturer must design his product to avoid subjecting the user to an 
unreasonable risk of injury in the event of an accident, regardless of the 
latter's cause, or face potential liability . 
The recent case of Harrison v. McDonough Power Equip., Inc., lOS is 
an example. There the plaintiff, who lost his foot when a young girl ran 
over his leg with a riding mower, claimed the manufacturer had been 
negligent in failing to design a safety shield or guard to be placed 
beneath the mower. 106 The federal court, noting that the issue of 
aggravation or enhancement of injury had not been squarely resolved 
104. See Horn v. General Motors Corp., 34 Cal. App.3d 773, 110 Cal. Rptr. 410, appeal 
docketed. In Hom, a horn cap dislodged from the steering column center when the 
plaintiff made a sharp left turn, thus exposing three sharp prongs designed to keep the 
cap in place. In a subsequent collision, the plaintiff's face struck the prongs, resulting in 
severe injuries. The plaintiff had not been wearing an available seat belt and the 
California Court of Appeals indicated that failure to wear seat belts could be a complete 
defense if such was the sole proximate cause of the injuries sustained; the court also 
indicated that if the wearing of seat belts would have reduced the injuries resulting from 
the allegedly defective condition, a jury could take this into consideration in deciding 
upon a recovery amount. 
105. 381 F. Supp. 926 (S.D. Fla. 1974). 
Another example: An independent force causes a train to derail, an event that is 
certainly forseeable. Is there a "second collision" duty on the part of a manufacturer to 
occupants? Cf. Turner v. Big Four Automotive Equipment Corp., 511 F.2d 133 (5th Cir. 
1975) (plaintiff struck in face by tire which exploded off a tire changer while being 
inflated by plaintiff). 
106. The plaintiffs (minor plaintiff and father) had settled a separate suit against the mower's 
owner (the minor plaintiff's grandfather) and the young girl. 
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by a Florida court at the time,107 reviewed the trend of Florida 
products cases and Larsen and then held: 
In light of the testimony introduced at the trial concerning the 
frequency of lawnmower-related accidents and the consequent 
number of injuries which result in the victim's loss of limbs, the 
imposition on the manufacturer of the duty of reasonable care 
in design to minimize or lessen the injurious effects of an 
accident is not unduly burdensome and is in line with the 
expansive trend of Florida negligence law. 108 
CONCLUSION 
Many products, like the automobile, at one time or another may be 
involved in either foreseeable impacts to their structures or other forms 
of foreseeable misuse, which may result in enhanced injury to a user or 
bystander. Thus, Larsen and its followers have reasoned that the 
manufacturer's duty of reasonable care in design should be viewed in 
light of such foreseeable risks. l09 
But as to duty the Dreisonstok court explained: 
Foreseeability ... is not to be equated with duty; it is, after all, 
but one factor, albeit an important one, to be weighed in 
determining the issue of duty. 110 
Dreisonstok also notes: 
The key phrase in the statement of the Larsen rule is 
"unreasonable risk of injury in the event of a collision," not 
foreseeability of collision. The latter circumstance is assumed in 
collision cases under the Larsen principle; it is the element of 
"unreasonable risk" that is uncertain in such cases and on which 
the determination of liability or no liability will rest. III 
107. See Evancho v. Thiel, 297 So.2d 40 (Fla. App. 1974). 
108. 381 F. Supp. at 930 (emphasis added). ct. Myers v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 253 Md. 
282,252 A.2d 855 (1969). 
109. One noted commentator has stated: 
But however valuable the foreseeability formula may be in aiding a jury or judge 
to reach a decision on the negligence issue, it is altogether inadequate for use by 
the judge as a basis of determining the duty issue and its scope. The duty issue, 
being one of law, is broad in its implications; the negligence issue is confined to 
the particular case and has no implications for other cases. There are many factors 
other than foreseeability that may condition a judge's imposing or not imposing a 
duty in a particular case, but the only factors for the jury to consider in 
determining the negligence issue are expressed in the foreseeability formula. 
Green, Foreseeability in Negligence Law, 61 COLUM. L. REv. 1401, 1417-18 
(1961). 
110. 489 F.2d at 1066, 1070. 
111. Id. at 1071. 
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Determination of "unreasonable risk" involves the "balancing" de-
scribed and applied in Dreisonstok and adopted in Young. 
The criteria for this delicate balancing, if applied intelligently in the 
complex field of product design, should eliminate the possibility that a 
jury will make a manufacturer an insurer of its product, that is, 
imposing a duty upon the manufacturer to design a product that 
protects persons from the physical effects of its misuse. However, even 
though economic restrictions are considered, this criteria should allow 
recovery by a person who sustains enhanced injury due to a product 
that is not reasonably safe within the existing state of the art. 
